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INTRODUCTION 
 
On the Origin of Species1 marked a shift in the appreciation not only of species’ origins, but 
also of species themselves. So it often is that when the source of an object or phenomenon is 
examined, we gain valuable insights into the thing itself. It is this kind of motivation that lies 
behind the philosophical interest in language acquisition. The thought is that if we can 
understand how children come to learn language, we will inevitably become clearer about the 
nature of language itself. The problem, however, arises from the fact that this relationship can 
go both ways, and a pre-developed theory of language can often inform our theory of language 
acquisition. If one goes into the project of examining language acquisition with pre-conceived 
notions about the nature of language itself, they are likely to ask their questions in ways which 
presuppose those notions. So it is, at least, with most ostensive models of language acquisition. 
Ostension is (roughly) the view that children come to understand language by watching adults 
point (or more generally gesture) towards an object, while the adult also utters the word which 
is associated (in some way) with that object – thereby teaching the child to associate the word 
with the object. It should be noted that ‘object’ does not refer to strictly physical ‘objects’ 
(nouns, items in the world), but rather to anything which can take the place of ‘x’ in a sentence 
like “x is the object of my attention”. As such, our ‘objects’ can be things like tables and chairs, 
but also thoughts, concepts, actions, etc. 
The ostensive project directly presupposes a deep distinction between gestures and language; 
gestures, which are already understood, are being used to teach language, which is not. The 
aim of this paper is to challenge this philosophical distinction. It is not something unique to 
ostensive theories of language acquisition, but an examination of such theories will serve us 
best in bringing the nature of this distinction to light, for it plays a fundamental role in the very 
justification of such projects.  
The first chapter of this paper, Making Ostension Manifest, dedicates itself to this purpose – 
examining in detail a recent ostensive model of language acquisition, and demonstrating the 
function and role of the language-gesture divide therein. In the second chapter, The Language-
Gesture Divide, we will focus sharply on this distinction, and demonstrate that no sharp divide 
between the two is viable: any method of distinguishing gestures from language instances will 
                                                          
1 Darwin, C., On the Origin of Species, rev. ed. G. Beer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
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be either too arbitrary to do the philosophical work required, or will cause us to miscategorise 
certain behaviours which seem clearly to be one or the other. In light of the inability to 
distinguish gesture from language, we will re-examine the question of language-acquisition, 
show how it had been fundamentally misconstrued, and propose a new way of understanding 
the problem at hand. Finally, in the third chapter, To Convey Content, we will revitalise the 
notions of gesture and language from the first, and examine how a new conjoint theory will 
give us new resources with which we can examine questions regarding meaning, speech acts, 
looseness of communication, and more. We will examine the various other places that the 
language-gesture divide has had influences, and briefly show how to reformulate our theories 
without it. 
The primary goal of this thesis is not to deny the work of other philosophers who have worked 
in the philosophy of language, as well as in action and gesture theory, but instead to show that 
by considering gestures and language as intertwined, we can have each apply to the other. The 
philosophy of language will have significant impact on our understanding of gestures, and our 
theories about gestures will come in turn to influence the philosophy of language.  
 5 
MAKING OSTENSION MANIFEST 
 
Thou, Nature, art my goddess; to thy law 
My services are bound. Wherefore should I 
Stand in the plague of custom and permit 
The curiosity of nations to deprive me? 
 - Edmund1 
 
It often seems as though for every account we have of ostension as a theory of language 
acquisition, we have another which criticises it. Certainly, if we deny that gestures are the 
primary (if not exclusive) mode of pre-linguistic communication, it is hard to know what else 
could possibly claim that right. But yet, the jump from gestures to language that ostension seeks 
to explain is undeniably troublesome. And so, ostension stands, shadow-boxing in the centre 
of the ring, with no real opponents to fight, yet unsure what it must do to convince the judges 
to ring the bell and announce the winner. 
For the purposes of this paper, the account of ostension that I will focus on is that in Chad 
Engelland’s book Ostension: Word Learning and the Embodied Mind2. I do this for the 
following reasons: Firstly, his account is perhaps the most thorough and well considered 
contemporary examination of language acquisition, and as such serves as a prime launching 
point for an examination of the topic. Secondly, where there is significant fault to be found in 
this book, it is in conception, not execution. My criticism of Engelland does not consist in 
undermining or questioning his arguments, but rather in examining the very question that is 
asked out the outset, and demonstrating that the question is fundamentally misconceived. As 
such, this chapter will focus primarily on elucidating Engelland’s thoughts, rather than 
critically examining them. There certainly are questions to be raised about Engelland’s work 
on a fine-grained level, but such concerns are beyond (or perhaps beneath) the scope of this 
paper, for the work done in answering a faulty question is far less in need of critique than the 
question itself. 
It shall perhaps be worth briefly examining what is required of a theory of ostension, both in 
the question that it seeks to answer, and the classic objections it faces, which will then allow 
                                                          
1 Shakespeare, W., King Lear, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007)  
2 Engelland, C., Ostension: Word Learning and the Embodied Mind, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014) 
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us to make more sense of the moves that Engelland makes. First, the fundamental question, as 
put by Engelland himself, is: “What is the principal prelinguistic means for intentions to be 
aligned and first words learned?”1 That is to say, how do we make the jump from having no 
language to having some language? The traditional ostensive answer to this question is that by 
using bodily gestures, we link (in some way) the words (or their sounds) with objects in the 
world. This only raises more questions however: How are gestures understood? Do they 
themselves need to be learned? If they do not, then how do we account for them? How do 
gestures (which are notoriously ambiguous) fix the meanings of words (which are far more 
specific)? In order to develop a workable account of ostension that deals with these questions, 
Engelland does two main things: he develops a phenomenology of gestures that allows for our 
actions to manifest our intentions, and simultaneously develops a theory of mind that allows 
for our intentions to become manifest. With these resources, and a variety of thoughts taken 
from Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Augustine, Aristotle and others, he seeks to give a detailed 
and systematic account of the way in which a prelinguistic infant can come to understand and 
use language. 
 
NATURE VS. CONVENTION 
We will begin with phenomenology. The main thrust of Engelland’s phenomenological 
account of gestures is that they make the intentions of the actor genuinely manifest. In doing 
so, the infant can see the way that the adult engages with the world, and so their uses of 
language become more transparent. It is essential to note here, that Engelland holds ‘gesture’ 
to refer to any action that communicates something, regardless of an intent to communicate. 
This is slightly different to many others’ uses of the term, which distinguish between gestures 
and mere action based on communicative intent (roughly: gesture = action + communicative 
intent)2. However, Engelland argues that often we communicate without intending to (or even 
while intending not to), for example, “The person who turns bright red with embarrassment is 
not intending to make his feeling palpable. His bodily movement reveals his affections 
independent of his intentions.”3 Engelland also claims that even simple actions like watching 
                                                          
1 Engelland, Ostension: xvi 
2 See Macarthur, D., Reflections on “Architecture is a Gesture”, Paragrana, 23:1, (2014): 88-100 for a different 
account of gesture. Note: little rides on this difference – Engelland simply wants to consider the wider range of 
communicative actions. So, too, do I - in fact the purpose of this paper is, in a sense, to consider the whole range 
of communicative actions. 
3 Engelland, Ostension: 157 (emphasis my own) 
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a bird fly past,1 or picking up a glass of milk,2 communicate a particular engagement with the 
world, and are thus relevantly ‘gestural’. The level to which our engagement is clear (certainly 
a face flushing with embarrassment is more obviously communicative than watching a bird fly 
past) does not change the fact that engagement is revealed - it will merely make it more or less 
difficult to interpret. 
It is important to highlight the kinds of actions that can be gestures without having 
communicative intent. These actions are what Engelland calls ‘natural’, because they convey 
a certain engagement with the world simply in virtue of being the very action that instantiates 
the engagement. This is to say that when one is merely going about their life, the actions they 
perform communicate an engagement with certain things in the world, due to the fact that the 
actions themselves are engaging the world. Anscombe is tracking a similar idea when she states, 
Well, if you want to say at least some true things about a man’s intentions, you will 
have a strong chance of success if you mention what he actually did or is doing. For 
whatever else he may intend… the greater number of the things which you would say 
straight off a man did or is doing, will be things he intends.3  
To take the earlier example of picking up a glass of milk: when someone picks up a glass of 
milk, their actions themselves are engaging with the milk, and their intentions regarding the 
milk become accessible. Now, it could be said that someone could be picking up milk could 
have a variety of intentions regarding it, and to this point Engelland, using the ideas of 
Aristotle4 as his guide, states, “The inclinations of our joint human natures constrain our desires 
and highlight certain features of the world over others.”5 There are certain things that humans, 
as animals, have particular interests in - food, shelter, procreation: our ‘primal instincts’, and 
so our intentions regarding objects of our attention are going to generally consist in fulfilling 
these interests. It is at very least likely that one’s intentions regarding a glass of milk involve 
drinking it, feeding it to a child, or something similar (depending on the context of the action). 
This category of ‘natural’ behaviours is contrasted against that of ‘conventional’ ones, the 
primary example of which is language. Invoking Plato’s argument in the Cratylus6, Engelland 
                                                          
1 ibid.: 71 
2 ibid.: 157-158 
3 Anscombe, G. E. M., Intention, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969) 
4 Particularly Aristotle, On the Soul. trans. J. A. Smith; and Aristotle, Movement of Animals, trans. A. S. L. 
Farquharson in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Ed. Jonathan Barnes, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 
5 Engelland, Ostension: xx 
6 Plato, Cratylus, trans. C. D. C. Reeve, in Complete Works, ed. John Cooper, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997) 
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claims that words are conventional, by which he means that “The sounds of our words, even 
though constrained by certain phonemic patterns, are arbitrarily conjoined to their sense.”1 In 
this way, learning words (or the appropriate sounds or marks to make which invoke them) is 
just a matter of learning these conventions - the arbitrary ways in which the sounds and symbols 
map to meanings. And so, in a way the project of language acquisition becomes one of moving 
from natural gestures which can be understood (more or less) automatically by all humans, to 
conventional language. It is worth noting that this is a very thin notion of convention (simply 
that words are somehow contingent - they could have different meanings, or conversely our 
meanings could be associated with different sounds). However, Engelland’s project does not 
particularly lean into this definition, certainly it places very little weight there. The word 
‘convention’ is picked simply to serve as a distinction against natural behaviours, which 
contrastingly necessarily convey the meanings that they do. 
 
MANIFESTATION OR INFERENCE 
As stated above, Engelland argues that gestures (particularly natural ones) make the agent’s 
intentions manifest. In doing so, he is contrasting with a common view2 which says that our 
intentions remain hidden, but can be inferred by witnessing actions. According to the 
manifestation account (which Engelland dubs ‘OM’ for ‘ostension by manifestation’) “gestures 
cut across the inner–outer divide”,3 by manifesting the mind in the body’s actions. The 
inference account (dubbed ‘OI’ accordingly) retains the mind/body separation, but concedes 
that bodily movements allow us to make inferences to mental content. Engelland presents 
several reasons why we might choose OM over OI. 
One reason why Engelland wants to doubt OI is that we seem to lack sufficient evidence to be 
able to make inferences of the kind that OI would have us make. Standardly inferences progress 
something like the following: we see smoke and so infer fire, because previously we have 
encountered smoke in connection with fire4. According to OI, our inferences to other minds 
are similar to this - we see another’s behaviour, and so infer that they have the same mental 
content as we normally have when exhibiting the same behaviour. Engelland points to two 
                                                          
1 Engelland, Ostension: xxvii 
2 held, for example, by Russell and Davidson among others, see particularly Russell, B., Human Knowledge: Its 
Scope and Limits, (London, Allen & Unwin, 1948): 208-209 and Davidson, D., ‘The Third Man’, in Truth, 
Language, and History, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005). 
3 Engelland, Ostension: 72 
4 ibid.: 137 
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remarks in Wittgenstein that question whether we really can make these kinds of inferences. 
First, he appropriates Wittgenstein’s story about children who all have boxes but cannot see 
the contents of each other’s boxes. One child may look inside and see a beetle there, but this 
would not prove sufficient evidence to claim that all the other boxes contain beetles.1 So it is 
with inference to other minds, Engelland suggests. Having apparent access to just one mind, 
we cannot build the level of evidence needed to support such an inference – surely for any kind 
of rigour, one would need to have access to evidence of multiple people’s minds.  
Another point, drawn again from Wittgenstein, is that one does not (and indeed cannot) attend 
to their own behaviour in the same way that they do to that of others. Wittgenstein makes this 
point in many ways, but perhaps the most obvious comes when he states, 
It is as impossible to view one’s own character from outside as it is one’s own 
handwriting. I have a one-sided relationship to my handwriting which prevents me 
from seeing it on the same footing as others’ writing and comparing it with theirs.2  
As such, even if the evidence one had was sufficient, they do not even have a way by which 
they can compare their own actions with those of others (they cannot see their own box and the 
boxes of others in the same way). Even when one sees oneself in a mirror, or hears a recording 
of their voice, they cannot attend to themselves in the way that others do. As Wittgenstein puts 
it, “I cannot observe myself unobserved. And I do not observe myself for the same purpose as 
I do someone else”3. 
The main reasoning that Engelland produces in favour of OM comes from Wittgenstein, 
alongside Augustine and Merleau-Ponty, who share Engelland’s focus on OM. Wittgenstein 
makes various remarks which point towards this, of which the most famous example is: “If I 
see someone writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think: all the same, his feelings are 
hidden from me.”4 Augustine makes a similar remark when he states: 
Now in this present life we are in contact with fellow-beings who are alive and display 
the movements of life; and as soon as we look at them we do not believe them to be 
alive, but we see them to be alive.5  
                                                          
1 In Engelland, Ostension: 47 - appropriated from Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, (Chichester: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2009): §293 
2 Wittgenstein, L., Culture and Value, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980): 23e 
3 Wittgenstein, L., Zettel, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967): §529 
4 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: §284 
5 In Engelland, Ostension: 133 - translation modified from Augustine, The City of God, trans. Henry Bettenson, 
(New York: Penguin, 1984) 
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In Merleau-Ponty’s work, Engelland points us particularly the discussion of ‘flesh’ in The 
Visible and the Invisible1. Here, the perspective is shifted from a first-personal/third-personal 
distinction between individual and other, to the second-personal relationship between us. 
Gestures, by their very nature, imply this kind of two-way relationship, as Merleau-Ponty says, 
“Reciprocally I know that the gestures I make myself can be the objects of another’s 
intention.”2 On the basis of these thoughts, Engelland argues that the sheer act of physically 
interacting in the world and gesturing interpersonally with one another removes the very 
possibility of other-minds skepticism. And where we can no longer doubt the mindedness of 
others, it is because their mind has become manifest in the ‘flesh’ before us. 
And so, with reason to doubt OI and consider OM, we come to Engelland’s theory of mind.3 
He believes that a commitment to OI is forced upon those who commit to the mind/body duality 
which is a product of the Cartesian method, from which he laments that contemporary 
philosophy is still yet to completely shake free. However, he thinks that thoughtful 
consideration of gesture has the power to rid us of this, for in gestures we see the way in which 
the mind and body (traditionally conceived) overlap. As Engelland puts it, “OM problematizes 
the divide between inner and outer evidence by observing that the inner of another is very often 
made manifest in outer appearance”.4 On the basis of OM, Engelland re-orients the 
fundamental question about understanding others:  
Wrong question: How can I move from a visible it to some invisible other I? 
Right question: In what way do you encounter me and I encounter you?5 
And so he returns to what is essentially a phenomenological question; if we accept that our 
bodily actions make our intentions manifest, what does our interpersonal interaction look like? 
 
ESTABLISHING JOINT PRESENCE 
Right at the start of his book, Engelland examines the work of a range of contemporary 
philosophers and what they say about language acquisition6. He commends Quine for seeing 
                                                          
1 Merleau-Ponty, M., The Visible and the Invisible, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis, (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1968) 
2 In Engelland, Ostension: 75 from Merleau-Ponty, M., ‘The Child’s Relation with Others’, in The Primacy Of 
Perception, ed. James Edie. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964): 118 
3 Note that this is quite significantly not a theory of mind as traditionally conceived. 
4 Engelland, Ostension: 133 
5 ibid.: 152 
6 See particularly, Engelland, Ostension: 4-8 
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the importance of ostension1, but agrees with Davidson2 that Quine’s account focuses too 
heavily on private evidence. Invoking Wittgenstein’s famous private language argument3, 
Engelland argues that language by very necessity must be public, and thinks that Quine fails to 
take this into account. Engelland commends Davidson’s account of ‘triangulation’, Searle’s 
account of ‘collective intentionality’, and the paradigm of ‘joint attention’ which he sees in 
various psychologists like Tomasello and Bloom, because they each place the emphasis on 
public, shared content. However, he feels that they each need to be taken one step further, 
because, while they place the evidence in the external world, they use this external evidence to 
align the separated internal minds of individuals. “Triangulation” has two minds come to share 
content by focusing on an item in the world which each has similar access to (completing the 
triangle, as it were), “collective intentionality” relies on the hidden intentions of two people 
being made similar by fixing upon something shared, and “joint attention” comes about when 
two people simultaneously engage with a certain aspect of their shared world.4 Without the 
inner/outer division, these positions are no longer tenable. And so, Engelland appropriates 
“joint attention”, and develops the term “joint presence”, to highlight the way in which the 
embodied minds engage directly with objects that are present to them. 
Now, according to Engelland, the way in which something becomes ‘jointly’ present is through 
the “imitation” and “mirroring” of gestures5. When Engelland talks about ‘imitation’ he has in 
mind not the bare copying of motor movements, but instead seeing the intention of another 
(through their animate engagement with the world), desiring to engage the world similarly 
(perhaps to understand the other person, or to seek their ends for oneself), and so imitating that 
engagement with the world. And so in imitating you, my actions will not necessarily be strictly 
identical, but they will encounter the relevant objects/parts of the world in the same way. An 
example that Engelland gives is of one person who watches a seagull pass overhead.6 Another 
person notices this, and looks up and begins also to follow the seagull’s movement. The literal 
copying of bodily motion is irrelevant, but what is relevant is that the first person’s interest in 
the bird has been reproduced by the second. 
                                                          
1 In Engelland, Ostension: 7. See Quine, W. V. O., Roots of Reference, (La Salle: Open Court, 1973) 
2 See Davidson, D., ‘Meaning, Truth and Evidence’ in Truth, Language and History, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2005). 
3 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: §244-271 
4 note: as a one sentence summary I have done each little justice, but the nuance of each, beyond the reliance on 
internal minds being aligned by something shared in the external world, is of little relevance here. 
5 Engelland, Ostension: 161 
6 ibid.: 71 
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Similarly, the term ‘mirroring’ is not employed to depict the act of literally following the bodily 
movements of another, but rather it overcomes the inability to ‘externally’ attend to oneself 
(even in a literal mirror), by making the other the object of attention. When the other person 
reproduces my engagement with the world, I am able to genuinely attend to it, for I am no 
longer the one ‘carrying’ the engagement. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “It is this transfer of my 
intentions to the other’s body and of his intentions to my own… that makes possible the 
perception of others”1. Our relationship becomes deeply reciprocal, as not only do I have the 
power to witness your intentions, but I’m also able to mirror them back to you. 
‘Joint presence’ is instituted when one person engages with something in the world and another 
person imitates it. In this instance, both people are focused on the same thing, and the object at 
hand becomes present to both of them in the same way. Due to this, they themselves become 
aligned and where they are aware of each other’s engagements, they are present also to each 
other. Recall here the notion of human nature which was examined earlier. As alluded to, 
Engelland argues that our human natures fix the things that we are going to care about, making 
establishing joint presence far more reliable. When two people both consider the same object, 
they are likely to consider it for the same reasons (particularly considering the manifest nature 
of our intentions). As such, joint presence can be established with at least relative consistency. 
As stated each person’s awareness of the other is important (particularly for ‘mirroring’). 
However, Engelland argues that joint presence can be (and perhaps more often than not, is) 
established asymmetrically. For example, if I see you engage with something, and I engage it 
in the same way, but you are unaware of my interest, it becomes jointly present to me and you, 
but only from my perspective. This may seem strange - that something could be jointly present 
to just one person - but it is essential to Engelland’s account of ostension. 
In Engelland’s account, joint presence is fundamentally important to ostension, because it is 
through joint presence that words spoken by an adult can be seen by a prelinguistic infant to 
pick out something in the world. Once joint presence is established, and both the adult and the 
infant are engaging a particular object, the words that the adult speaks can be seen by the child 
as directly relevant to the object at hand. So, as a crude example, when an adult brings a block 
over to a child, establishes joint attention upon the block and says the word “block”, the child 
attaches (in some relevant way) the sound “block” to ‘blocks’.  
                                                          
1 In Engelland, Ostension: 75, from Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Child’s Relation with Others’: 118 
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A major criticism that Engelland has of Wittgenstein is that he focuses overly on what 
Engelland calls the “Western model”1 of language acquisition, in which children are explicitly 
taught words. He thinks that this is not necessary (and even particularly uncommon), and 
claims that much of Wittgenstein’s famous critique of Augustine is unjustified because it 
falsely attributes this same model of teaching to him. Engelland claims that Augustine instead 
placed the onus of language learning on the child, who acquires language by “eavesdropping”2. 
In this model, a child is witness to language users interacting with the world in the course of 
their everyday lives, and using language as they do so. While this is happening, the child is 
following the embodied intentions of those adults, (instituting the asymmetrical kind of joint 
presence mentioned above), and so begins to see how the words spoken relate to the objects at 
hand. On these grounds, Engelland argues that the teacher is passive and the learner is active, 
which contrasts with the model he attributes to Wittgenstein, in which the teacher is active and 
the learner is passive. 
 
THE AMBIGUITY OF GESTURES 
One of the fundamental problems that ostensive accounts face is that gestures are notoriously 
ambiguous, and so appear to be a worryingly unreliable way of teaching. Engelland notes three 
kinds of ambiguity that gestures are often accused of, and seeks to show how his own account 
passes these. The first is the most basic kind, which Engelland attributes primarily to 
Wittgenstein3. This kind of ambiguity lies in the inability to know what aspect of the item at 
hand is being gestured to. A very simple example of this could be: if I point to a white table 
and say “table”, it is ambiguous whether I am picking out the whole object, just the surface, 
‘whiteness’, ‘smoothness’, or perhaps indefinitely many other potential objects or features. 
Engelland argues that this kind of ambiguity can often be solved by simple repetition - if I point 
to many tables of assorted colours and say “table” each time, I remove the possibility that I am 
pointing to ‘whiteness’. Where it cannot be solved in this way, he argues that it will be solved 
by the nature of ‘joint presence” – in the same way that the third form of ambiguity is solved 
below. 
The second kind of ambiguity, again attributed to Wittgenstein4, involves that of our gestures 
themselves. Take again the example of pointing: even if I somehow fix the kind of thing that 
                                                          
1 ibid.: 24, 54 
2 ibid.: 176 
3 See his discussion of pointing in Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: §33-35 
4 ibid.: §34-35 
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is being pointed to, it is impossible to know for sure which part of the world my point is 
supposed to pick out - perhaps I mean to point to the air just in front of my finger, or an object 
on the other side of a wall beyond our sight, or perhaps I intend that you follow the line of my 
arm not from shoulder to finger, but finger to shoulder, and I am pointing to something behind 
me. It is here that Engelland’s focus on learning from ‘natural’ gestures comes into play, for 
where there is not communicative intent, the gesture cannot be misinterpreted in the way 
suggested. Note that each example stated something like “perhaps I meant to point to such-
and-such” – if the teacher is not trying to direct attention to a certain thing then they cannot be 
misunderstood (there is, as it were, nothing to misunderstand). This is to say that this kind of 
ambiguity is only a problem for ‘conventional’ gestures. 
The third and most radical form of ambiguity is attributed to Quine1, and it involves the way 
in which a witness to ostension cannot even know what the word is intended to do (even if the 
infant knows what part of the world is targeted, they cannot know the purpose of the utterance 
regarding it). When discussing the case of the linguist trying to analyse the meaning of the 
utterance “gavagai”, Quine is not pointing just to the fact that “gavagai” could be about any 
aspect of the rabbit, but also to the fact that the linguist, choosing to let “gavagai” have a 
meaning which picks out an object (like ‘rabbit’), “imposes his own object-positing pattern 
without special warrant”2. That is to say, the linguist presumes that the native language picks 
out objects in the same way that his own language does. However, perhaps “gavagai” is not a 
“rabbit-heralding sentence” as presumed, but rather forms part of a cultural or religious ritual. 
To think that “gavagai” is uttered just to note that a rabbit is present would doubtlessly miss a 
huge portion of the significance of such a ritualistic utterance. Quine argues, as such, that this 
kind of ostensive learning radically underdetermines the meaning of the utterance – one cannot 
possibly know which of the indefinitely many ways of interpreting the purpose of the utterance 
is correct. 
To cancel this claim, Engelland invokes the concept of human nature, as well as the role of 
joint presence. As stated previously, Engelland argues that our human nature constrains the 
ways in which we care about, interact with and form intentions about the world. As such, the 
ways in which we break the world down (and institute terms by which to refer to these chunks) 
are limited - as humans, the ways in which the native tribe are going to care about the world 
                                                          
1 See Quine, W. V. O., Word and Object, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013) - Quine’s discussion of the linguist 
interpreting the utterance “gavagai” highlights this kind of ambiguity. 
2 Quine, W. V. O., ‘Speaking of Objects’, in Ontological Relativity: and Other Essays, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1969): 2 
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will be similar how English speakers do (and so their language will be similar). And on top of 
this, if joint presence is genuinely established, then the item of one’s interests cannot, as such, 
be doubted. If you have genuinely seen my intentions as manifest in my actions, then you will 
know what part of the world I am interested in, and so it comes for free, so to speak, that you 
see what function my words are serving. Finally, the fact that a language learner learns by 
seeing language speakers going about their lives and using language in the ways that they 
normally would (i.e. by what Engelland would call ‘eavesdropping’), means that the functions 
of their words are not hidden - one can see just be observing the patterns of usage what the 
word is in fact doing.1 
 
THE OSTENSIVE PICTURE 
And so, we can at last say what Engelland’s view of ostension consists in. In our everyday 
actions, we betray (and yet further, genuinely manifest) the ways in which we are engaged with 
the world. A spectator (in this case a prelinguistic infant) is able to follow our engagement, and 
imitate it, establishing ‘joint presence’. Then, when we use words to refer to the objects of our 
engagement, the infant learns to associate those words with the relevant objects. Even if, with 
only the cognitive powers of an infant, one is not able to do this as readily or consistently as an 
adult would, over a large period of time, the child will gradually become more and more 
proficient, becoming better both at understanding speech instances, and at reading the 
intentions of others based on their actions. 
It is clear to see how the distinction between gestures and language is an essential assumption 
of this theory. Engelland himself states that, “Word acquisition is puzzling, because language 
is a cultural and not a natural endowment”2, which contrasts to gestures, of which he argues 
that at least some are understood naturally. The purpose of the ostensive account is to explain 
how the jump from gestures to language is made. And so, having made the nature (and 
traditional role) of the language-gesture division clear, we will turn in the next chapter to it’s 
critique. 
  
                                                          
1 Whether or not this is an adequate answer to the problem will be addressed in the section ‘Loose 
Communication’ in chapter 3 of this paper. 
2 Engelland, Ostension: 70 
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THE LANGUAGE-GESTURE DIVIDE 
 
How curious: we should like to explain our understanding of a gesture by means of a translation into 
words, and the understanding of words by translating them into a gesture. (Thus we are tossed to and 
fro when we try to find out where understanding properly resides.) 
 - Wittgenstein1 
 
If we were to come up with a general formulation of ostensive theories of language acquisition, 
it would perhaps go like this: 
1: Children are not born with an understanding of language. 
2: Children do not come to understand language entirely of their own accord. 
(Without these first two an account of language acquisition is 
unnecessary) 
3a: Children are born with an understanding of the meaning of gestures. 
OR, 3b: Children come to understand the meaning of gestures entirely of their own 
accord. 
OR, 3c: Children learn to understand the meaning of gestures through some other 
(strictly non-linguistic) means. 
(One of these three is necessary to enable the child to understand 
ostension without prior access to language - note that if 3c is chosen, 
then this argument structure will need to be run again to show how 
gestures are learned) 
4: Children learn to understand language by combining (in some way) their 
understanding of gestures with the concurrent use of gestures and language by 
language speakers. 
(This is the ostensive process, and it is here that the bulk of 
explanation will likely occur) 
                                                          
1 Wittgenstein, Zettel: §227 
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5: Children do not come to understand language by any other means (except 
perhaps, by reference to other language). 
(Else language acquisition would be only partly ostensive - learning by 
reference to other language is often permitted, because there would still 
necessarily be an ostensive account of how the initial language is 
learned) 
Note that in order to hold any of the following pairs: (1, 3a), (2, 3b) and (5, 3c), it must be the 
case that language and gestures are distinct. As such, regardless of which of 3a, 3b or 3c is 
chosen1, the account will become contradictory if language and gestures overlap in any way. 
In other words, it is a direct consequence of the above that gestures and language are disjoint. 
Having become clear in the previous chapter what a detailed account of ostension consists in, 
and the fundamental role that the division between language and gesture has in justifying the 
project, the purpose of this chapter is to question this division, outline the relationship that 
language and gestures have (having removed the blockade between them), and finally 
rehabilitate ostension in light of this. The next chapter will then examine the various other 
outcomes of considering language and gesture in this way. 
 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SPEECH AND GESTURE 
Various psychological and linguistic studies into the relationship between gestures and 
language have shown them to be deeply connected. In one examination of these studies, 
Kendon concludes that gestures “are but another manifestation of the same underlying 
process”2 that produces speech. In another, McNeill makes this point even more explicit, 
arguing that “sentences and gestures develop internally together”3, and that “gestures are 
symbols equivalent to various linguistic units in meaning and function”4. While this does not 
necessarily provide reason to think that we should not distinguish the two philosophically, it 
does show us that we have grounds to consider them both members of the same broader 
category – as any such distinction would be only philosophical. This is to say, we should 
consider them both to be types of content-conveying behaviour. I do not take this to be a 
                                                          
1 Note that we have already suggested that Engelland’s project relies (at least primarily) on 3a. 
2 Kendon, A., Do Gestures Communicate? A Review. Research on Language and Social Interaction, 27:3 
(1994): 176 
3 McNeill, D., So You Think Gestures are Nonverbal? Psychological Review, 92, (1985): 350 
4 ibid.: 354 
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particularly controversial point – it is clear that they are both behaviours, and that they also 
both convey (in some way) content (of some kind). 
This category, ‘content-conveying behaviours’, is going to prove to be an important one, for 
here we have a way of talking about gestures and language regarding what they have in 
common. And so, the job of the person who seeks to assert the division between gestures and 
language is to show us where, within the category of content-conveying behaviours, to draw a 
sharp line in order to divide the two groups. I will attempt this project, and in doing so 
demonstrate that any method of division that we might be intuitively drawn to is going to be 
either too arbitrary to bear the explanatory weight that we need it to, or cause us to 
miscategorise things that seem undeniably gestural or undeniably linguistic. 
 
A CONVENTIONAL DISTINCTION 
We will begin with the most likely candidate, and the one that I think Engelland seems to rely 
on, which is conventionality. We have already discussed the important place that the categories 
of natural and conventional have in Engelland’s work, and this is what leads me to believe that 
he would take this approach. As discussed, Engelland claims (following Plato) that language 
is conventional, and also (from Augustine and Merleau-Ponty) that at least some gestures are 
purely natural. The pre-linguistic infant gets their first foothold using their in-built 
understanding of natural gestures, and is thereby able to develop an understanding of words. 
Certainly, the natural-conventional distinction does seem to be able to do the explanatory work 
required, but it also leads us to some unwanted results. The most obvious way to assign the 
categories of gesture and language on this account might be to say: “If it is purely natural it is 
‘gesture’, and if it is purely conventional then it is ‘language’”. But what are we then able to 
say about anything that is a mix of the two? Remember, we cannot allow for the categories of 
gesture and language to intermingle in any way - lest we run into contradiction in the argument 
presented at the beginning of this chapter. And so if we had a behaviour which was both natural 
and conventional we would be forced to tear the two apart, and say that the behaviour has a 
distinct gestural aspect and a distinct linguistic aspect. How someone might come to learn such 
a behaviour will be puzzling (do they learn just the gestural part first, and then the linguistic 
part subsequently? what would this look like?). We might be tempted to shift our definition in 
one of two ways at this point, 1) to either make ‘gesture’ just the purely natural, and anything 
with any degree of conventionality is ‘language’, or 2) to make ‘language’ just the purely 
conventional, and make anything that is in any way natural ‘gesture’ (this second camp I find 
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the most likely, and I think Engelland would probably take this option). A third and fourth 
option might be, 3) to find a point between the two extremes to draw a line, and 4) to stick to 
the strict definition of each, and to leave anything in the middle separate (it is not necessary 
that the union of gesture and language be equal to the entire set of content-conveying 
behaviour). Let us examine each of these suggestions. 
The first, that we make gesture just the purely natural, and let all else be language, is straight-
forwardly untenable. A brief examination of many of our gestures will show this. Consider, for 
example, the act of ‘giving the middle finger’ to someone. In order to make sense of this action 
at all, we have to accept that it is at least partially conventional. To define gesture according to 
1), we would be forced say that this is not a gesture, which seems to divert massively from any 
real sense of the term ‘gesture’. 
Let us consider this act further. In what sense does it make sense to call it natural? Does the 
act of closing my fist, raising just my third finger to point towards the sky, and thrusting my 
arm towards someone have any meaning other than that which is imparted on it by convention? 
What might such an action be said to convey? I certainly can think of no good answer to give. 
One might say that it does convey something naturally - that without the convention we would 
follow it as we follow any other finger pointing, and look up at the sky. Firstly, I find this hard 
to accept - insofar as there is a natural way to point, it is not like this. Secondly, even if we 
accept this proposal, that which is being conveyed here is entirely detached from our current 
experience of the gesture at hand. When presented with this gesture, one experiences zero 
compulsion to look into the sky. What is conveyed presently is completely unrelated to such a 
thought. I tender then, that the meaning embedded in this gesture is purely conventional (read: 
the connection between the act of raising the finger and its meaning - disrespect or something 
similar - is purely arbitrary). No number of stories about how the gesture evolved from bowmen 
signalling that they still had fingers by which they could draw a bow will change this fact. Even 
if we consider that showing fingers in that way is a natural signifier of the fact of having fingers 
(which is plausible), the fact that having fingers is a demonstration of disrespect will instead 
carry the weight of convention. And so on we might go - nevertheless, no etymology of gestures 
will rid us of the conventional nature of our gestures, it will merely show us how our 
conventions developed. 
If we accept that ‘giving the middle finger’ is in fact purely conventional (at least as much so 
as our words are), then we have denied the possibility of 2), 3) or 4). If we were to draw our 
distinction on any of these grounds, as we would inevitably miscategorise many gestures (like 
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‘giving the finger’) as language. As such, we should abandon the notion of making a distinction 
between language and gestures based on conventionality. 
 
THE METHOD OF PRODUCTION 
Perhaps, however, it is the focus on convention that is flawed, and we can find some other 
feature by which we might distinguish the two. Certainly, it feels intuitive that we could 
distinguish the two on strictly naturalistic grounds, or perhaps even phenomenological ones. 
For example, a tempting first-instinct method of distinguishing gestures from language might 
proceed by examining the method of production of each (bodily/vocally), or perhaps the 
method of reception of each (visual/audial). There is also the idea that perhaps we can 
distinguish them by what they are able to do, for example in Chapter 7 of Ostension, Engelland 
hints towards a difference between language and gesture that lies in the different scope of 
reference that each has. Specifically, he claims that language allows us to communicate about 
things that are “spatially or temporally absent”1, while gestures do not. Similarly, one might be 
tempted to say that language has the potential to refer to imaginary, or fake things, where 
gestures cannot. Finally, one might think the key factor that distinguishes the two is that words 
have definite meanings, while gestures do not. There are, perhaps, more ways by which one 
might seek to make this distinction, however I cannot possibly deal with all of these here. The 
most I can do is examine those that I have explicitly suggested here, and in doing so 
demonstrate the kinds of ways that other potential suggestions are going to fall short. 
The first two (distinguishing according to the method of production or method of reception of 
each) may well seem the most intuitive, as the most prominent forms of evidence we have by 
which we might make this distinction in common experience, are the bare sensory differences 
between gesturing and speaking, and witnessing gestures and listening to speech2. A brief 
mention of sign language, which is phenomenologically gestural, yet in a significant way 
linguistic (hence the name), and conversely that we have gestures which are vocal - as 
Wittgenstein notes, “There is a strongly musical element in verbal language. (A sigh, the 
intonation of a voice in a question, in an announcement, in longing; all the innumerable 
                                                          
1 Engelland, Ostension: 143 
2 I focus on spoken language instead of written language here because it seems even more obvious how written 
language is going to fail to be physically different to gestures  
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gestures made with the voice.)”1 - should discourage the continued pursuit of this line of 
thought.  
However, a stronger version of this idea could perhaps be developed, for certainly our 
interactions with both gestures and language are undeniably impacted by the modality by which 
we experience them. And by that I mean, when we attend to gestures, the act of producing them 
is an important part of what we focus on, whereas when someone speaks, the physical motion 
is no longer important (the way in which they vibrate their throat or move their mouth is of 
little to no consequence to us). Similarly, when we encounter written language, the movements 
the author made while writing or typing do not standardly come into our consideration. 
However, it seems that in gestures, the bodily movement is intrinsically important to the 
gesture’s reception. This idea has the potential to bypass the sign language example (having no 
personal experience with sign language I cannot say for sure whether a master ceases to attend 
in any important way to the bodily action and follows just the ‘meanings’ - but I could certainly 
see this as plausible). I think that it has little to say about vocalised gestures however, for we 
still do not attend to the production of the sound in the course of understanding it. And before 
the objection is raised that these are not really gestures, recall Engelland’s own desire to include 
exactly these kinds of behaviours - those that betray (manifest without intent) the mind of the 
agent. Sighs, screams, yells, grunts, sobbing, delighted squeals, all of these are the kinds of 
behaviours which Engelland has particularly in mind, and so to exclude these from the category 
of gestures will go directly against the way in which we established our term ‘gesture’ in the 
first place. 
To come at this thought also from the other angle, we just don’t genuinely attend to the bodily 
movements involved in gesturing in the way such a thought might suggest. Try this: the next 
time you see someone wave to you, focus intently on the way they are moving their hand. 
Notice that you no longer experience the wave as you previously did. The wave as a greeting 
is lost to you, in the same way that repeating the word “cup” over and over again causes it to 
lose its meaning. For gestures like waving, we do not focus our attention on the act of 
production, at least no more than we do when we hear a word. And so, the way in which our 
attention focuses on gestures is not fundamentally different to the way it does on language, and 
as such this is not going to be able to serve as our method of distinction. 
 
                                                          
1 Wittgenstein, Zettel: §161 
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SPACIO-TEMPORAL PROXIMITY 
If we are not able to distinguish gesture from language on the basis of the modality of our 
interaction with each, then perhaps we can do so by examining their properties. Engelland 
suggests one such way in which we might be able to do so, when he claims that words are able 
to target things which are not immediately at hand (whether due to being somewhere else, at a 
different time, or non-existent), while gestures cannot. For example, using language I can talk 
about Jupiter, despite being unable (currently) to see Jupiter; I can talk about the medieval 
period of Japan, despite it having finished roughly 500 years ago; and I can talk about Middle-
Earth, despite it being a fictional place. However, I do not seem to be able to gesture towards 
any of these things. Emma Borg puts this another way when she says, “The meaning of a non-
linguistic ostensive act seems ineliminably tied to its context in a way that the meaning of a 
linguistic act is not”1.  
Such thinking seems to be mistaken. Or perhaps I should say it is mis-leading, because it is 
certainly true that I can think of no way to gesture towards Jupiter, Medieval Japan or Middle-
Earth. This does not mean however, that I cannot in principle gesture towards unseen, 
temporally dislocated or fictional things. Let me give an example. Let us imagine that I am 
kicking a ball in my backyard with a friend, Bob. Bob goes inside briefly to get a drink of 
water, and while he’s gone, I accidentally kick the ball over the neighbour’s fence. I wave at 
Bob, who is inside and cannot hear me, to draw his attention, and once I have it I mime the 
following: first, I draw a circle in the air, next I mimic the action of kicking a ball, next I draw 
an arc through the air, and finally, I point towards the neighbour’s fence. What have I gestured 
towards? Certainly nothing present. In fact, I have gestured towards two things, the ball, which 
is now spatially inaccessible, and my kicking of it over the fence, which is now temporally 
distinct. Further, let us imagine that I actually threw the ball over the fence, yet still performed 
the same communicative actions - perhaps because I thought that miming a throw would be 
more confusing to Bob. I have gestured towards the same things, yet one was a fiction: the 
kick. My gestures have told Bob a story, a false one, but nonetheless one intended to 
communicate some particular point (i.e. that the ball is now in the neighbour’s yard). In this 
example, the fictional gesture is used in a good-intentioned way, but gestures can also be 
deceitful, in the way that words are. Consider the well-known prank which consists in pointing 
to another person’s shirt (as if to point out a stain or mark), and then, when the other person 
                                                          
1 Borg, E., ‘Intention-Based Semantics’ in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, ed. Ernest 
Lepore and Barry C. Smith. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006): 261 
 23 
looks down, exploiting the vulnerable position that they are in, perhaps by hitting them on the 
nose with the outstretched hand. 
It seems clear that we can, at least in principle, gesture towards things that are not within our 
direct context. As such, we are not going to be able to distinguish between gestures and 
language on this basis. 
 
A MEANINGFUL DIVISON 
My inability to gesture towards Jupiter, Medieval Japan or Middle-Earth is not due to being 
unable in principle to gesture toward things outside my direct physical context, but due to the 
lack of specificity of my gestures. Perhaps, then, we can distinguish them based on their relative 
specificity. This idea will not serve our purpose because specificity is a trait of a system of 
communication, not of the behaviours themselves. A language gains specificity in virtue of the 
variety of terms it contains (and a system of gestures likewise gains specificity by having a 
variety of gestures). Think for example of the primitive languages Wittgenstein discusses 
involving just 4 words, “block”, “pillar”, “slab” and “beam”1 – the only sense of specificity 
this language has is that which is circumscribed by the terms it contains; one can be ‘specific’ 
about what kind of object one wants, but not its features (one could not ask for a ‘white’ pillar 
instead of a ‘red’ one). As such, we cannot distinguish between language and gestures based 
on their relative specificity, because in order to measure specificity we have to already know 
what each contains (which is obviously begging the question). 
However, we can perhaps develop a stronger version of this idea. A philosopher inclined to 
hold that words have definite meanings, might want to make this their defining characteristic. 
That is to say, that words have definite meanings where gestures do not. 
This is not going to be able to do the work required for the following reason: any grounds, 
theoretical or prudential, upon which someone asserts that words have definite meanings is 
going to provide reason to believe that gestures (at the very least some gestures) also have 
definite meanings. In other words, any argument by which one might support definite meanings 
for language can be re-purposed to support definite meanings for gestures. Note that I am 
remaining agnostic about whether or not words have definite meanings, and I am merely 
suggesting that it is going to either hold or not hold in the same way for both. 
                                                          
1 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: §2 
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Let me first give a brief example to illustrate my point before attempting to give a more detailed 
defence. One reason that one might want to assert that words have definite meanings is based 
on a certain view of communication. Let us say that all communication consists in the 
following: A has a thought. A finds the words (or gestures) that express this thought and utters 
them. B, listening to the words, grasps their meanings and so is able to understand what A is 
thinking. It is something like this view that seems to underpin Locke’s thinking when he states, 
“To make words serviceable to the end of communication, it is necessary as has been said that 
they excite in the hearer exactly the same idea they stand for in the mind of the speaker.”1 If 
we deny definite meanings, then we seem to deny this kind of communication - how else can 
a speaker be sure that they correctly express their thoughts in words, and how else can a listener 
be sure that they correctly understand the thoughts expressed? However, if we assert definite 
meanings on this ground - in order to fix communication - we are going to be forced to say that 
gestures too, have definite meanings, for they also communicate reliably and consistently. 
To make this point more generally, let us consider the word ‘Hello’ and the gesture of waving. 
It is not clear to me how one might assert that the meaning of ‘Hello’ can claim to be of an 
entirely different kind (insofar as one is definite and the other not) to that of the wave. Certainly, 
a wave has many different uses, but so too does the word ‘Hello’ (and most other words for 
that matter). In fact, one of the key burdens upon someone who asserts definite meanings is to 
account for the fact that our words do have many different uses. The Gricean project,2 for 
example, can push in this direction. By shifting the burden of meanings from the words 
themselves to the intentions of the utterers, Grice accounts for the various pragmatic demands 
that others fall prey to (for example the problem mentioned - that words have multiple uses). 
Similarly, Horwich’s Use Theory of Meaning3, attempts to account for our usage of words 
directly, by making the meaning of a word, w, “the non-semantic feature of w that explains w’s 
overall deployment.”4 As such, he builds the ability to explain our various uses of words 
directly into his account. 
For each of these projects, it is not difficult to see how we will go about claiming that gestures 
also have definite meanings. In the first case, Grice explicitly accepts that (some) gestures fit 
                                                          
1 Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (New York: Dover, 1959): book 3, chap. 9, sec. 6 
2 See Grice, P., Meaning, Philosophical Review, 66:3, (1957): 377-288; Grice, P., Utterer’s Meaning and 
Intentions, Philosophical Review, 78:2 (1969): 147; and Grice, P., Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence Meaning and 
Word Meaning, Foundations of Language 4 (1969): 225 
3 See Horwich, P., Meaning, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); and Horwich, P., Reflections on Meaning, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2005) 
4 Horwich, Reflections: 26 
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into his account in the same way as words do when he says, “I use ‘utterance’ as a neutral word 
to apply to any candidate for meaningNN”1. Note that the meaning associated with a gesture like 
a wave is clearly non-natural (meaningNN) in the Gricean sense, as it bears communicative 
intent. And so a Gricean will automatically accept that holding words or sentences to have 
definite meanings on these grounds will give us reason to claim that gestures (at least those that 
are non-natural) have definite meanings too. 
Horwich’s project will also lead us down the same path. Horwich states his overall thesis as: 
The meaning of a word, w, is engendered by the non-semantic feature of w that explains 
w’s overall deployment. And this will be an acceptance-property of the following 
form:- ‘that such-and-such w-sentences are regularly accepted in such-and-such 
circumstances’ is the idealised law governing w’s use (by the relevant ‘experts’, given 
certain meanings attached to various other words).2 
Without going too deeply into the detail of it’s explanation and defence, I see no reason why 
this same process could not be used to find the meaning of a gesture. If we replace ‘word’ with 
‘gesture’, ‘w’ with ‘g’ and ‘w-sentences’ with ‘g-instances’ (and making a slight modification 
at the end to include both words and gestures) we get the following: 
The meaning of a gesture, g, is engendered by the non-semantic feature of g that 
explains g’s overall deployment. And this will be an acceptance-property of the 
following form:- ‘that such-and-such g-instances are regularly accepted in such-and-
such circumstances’ is the idealised law governing g’s use (by the relevant ‘experts’, 
given certain meanings attached to various other words and gestures). 
There is nothing particularly suspect in this formulation. The crux of Horwich’s project is his 
focus on ‘deployment’ and ‘acceptance’ and I see no reason to think that we cannot talk about 
‘deploying’ and ‘accepting’ gestures in the same way. If one thinks that Horwich’s original 
project is going to find us the meanings of our words, then they are also going to have to accept 
that the above could be used to find the meanings of our gestures. 
And so, neither Grice’s nor Horwich’s projects are going to be able to distinguish language 
from gestures on the grounds of definite meanings. In general, any (plausible3) theory of 
definite meanings which adequately addresses the various pragmatic concerns generally 
levelled against such theories is going to provide us grounds to also claim that at least some 
                                                          
1 Grice, Meaning: 214 
2 Horwich, Reflections: 26 
3 Certainly one could give an account that necessarily excludes gestures, but such an account will, I think, be 
overly artificial - such an exclusion will not be of genuine help to the project itself. 
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gestures have definite meanings also. And, contrapositively, if one wants to deny that gestures 
have definite meanings then they will also have to deny that words do. Obviously, it is not 
possible to definitively prove this in the general case, but this brief demonstration shows how 
other attempts to distinguish language and gesture based on definite meanings is going to fail. 
 
ON CONTENT-CONVEYING BEHAVIOURS 
Clearly, the thought that we can maintain a sharp division between gestures and language is 
wrong. And so, let us change the target of our theorising from each of these independently to 
how they connect. That is to say, let us make content-conveying behaviours the target of our 
theories. This does not mean that we must scrap all of the work that has been done regarding 
language and gesture, but instead that we examine the place that these theories themselves have 
within the broader category. Perhaps there will be some things, like sign language, which are 
impacted by both gestural theory and the philosophy of language. As well as this, our earlier 
notions of conventionality, specificity, modality of interaction, and others which were not 
explicitly examined, still bear weight here. If we consider the entire set of content-conveying 
behaviours (even if this set is not definite), we can begin to arrange it according to these notions 
(insofar as this is possible). But it is essential to note that this is a choice. One can organise, 
divide and manipulate the data as desired, but we should note that this is, so to speak, a post-
ontological move. It is no longer concerned with what exists, but with how we should interpret, 
analyse and examine it. And as such, the burden is upon the theorist in question to account for 
their reasons for what they do. At minimum, if their results are not more powerful, useful, etc. 
- if we have no principled reason to hold their theory over another - then we should question 
why they manipulate the data in the way they do in the first place. 
So I think it is with ostension. Certainly, a separation between gesture and language will enable 
us to make a meaningful attempt at explaining language acquisition, but it is no better than 
what we could attempt without such a division. In fact, the problem of language acquisition, in 
the way that it is traditionally formulated, only becomes an issue when this division is held in 
the first place. When we consider the broader category of content-conveying behaviours, the 
argument from the beginning of this chapter can be reformulated as: 
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1: Children are not born with an understanding of all content-conveying 
behaviours. 
2: Children are born with an understanding of some content-conveying 
behaviours. 
3: Children gradually learn to understand more and more content-conveying 
behaviours by combining (in some way) those that they do understand with the 
use of content-conveying behaviours by adults. 
4: Children do not learn to understand content-conveying behaviours through any 
other method than this. 
The details that fill in the ostensive process that makes this happen I will lift entirely from 
Engelland, pausing briefly to shake off the loose dirt that hangs from it (having spent my time 
up until now digging it out of the ground it had been buried in). The ostensive process that he 
outlines (involving manifest intentions, natural gestures, the role of infants as their own 
teachers, etc.) is the essential method by which previously understood behaviours can be 
combined with the actions of others to enable the understanding of new behaviours. 
Importantly, however, this is now a gradual transition into language (as traditionally defined), 
rather than the sharp jump from gesture to language that Engelland’s project presupposes. 
Children, starting with an understanding of natural behaviours (in the way Engelland notes), 
are able to gradually become more and more familiar with more complex behaviours. This 
increase in ‘complexity’ does not need to be of any particular kind - it can involve increasing 
conventionality, specificity, difficulty in physical production, something else entirely, or some 
combination of these.  
 
‘ACQUIRING’ LANGUAGE 
It is worth noting that my own notion of ‘acquiring language’ is going to be quite different to 
Engelland’s. Engelland has a sharp notion of acquisition: he thinks that there is a definite point 
at which one has acquired language (or at least a given piece of it). Without such a notion, talk 
of learning “first words” wouldn’t come about – such a phrase suggests both that there is at 
least a rough order in which words are learned, and a distinct point at which each has been 
successfully acquired. 
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Instead of holding a sharp notion of having ‘acquired’ a new word (or behaviour), we should 
accept that acquisition is a gradual and perpetual process. We gradually go from understanding 
simpler behaviours to more complex ones, while simultaneously deepening our understanding 
of those we already have. And this is a process that continues throughout every interaction we 
have; we are constantly updating our understanding of words. Early in life, when a person has 
only a select few instances of a behaviour on which to draw, a new piece of evidence might 
drastically shift their understanding, but as they grow older and have more experience, a novel 
use of a particular word or gesture will only subtly impact their overall understanding of it. 
Notice, however, that a question like, “Do you speak English?” is reserved for obscure 
circumstances – this question is not something that generally troubles us in our day-to-day 
lives. Times in which we ask it might include when speaking to a foreigner from a non-English-
speaking country, or when in a non-English-speaking country oneself. And note also, how 
useless the answer “Yes” might be, compared to “Just a little bit”, “Enough to make basic 
conversation” or “I am perfectly fluent”. Wittgenstein tells us in various ways that “To 
understand a language means to have mastered a technique”1. And just as it is with the 
mastering of any other technique, it is bordering on nonsensical to ask for the definite point at 
which someone has ‘acquired’ this skill. 
 
A NEW OSTENSION 
So, having first established the nature of Engelland’s project in the previous chapter, we have 
come in this one to it’s critique. The fundamental distinction between gestures and language, 
upon which his project rests, has been demonstrated to be entirely unfounded. Removing this 
distinction does not rid us of the ostensive project however. Engelland employs ostension to 
take us from understanding gestures to acquiring ‘first words’. Moving forward, however, 
ostension serves to take our understanding of simple behaviours to allow us to understand more 
complex ones (and the simpler ones to a deeper level). In a strong sense, this new ostension 
does both far less and far more than Engelland envisioned. It does far less, because it no longer 
serves to bridge a large gap - to jump from one kind of thing to another. Instead, ostension is a 
far more subtle, low-key process, by which one moves gradually within terrain that is already 
partially understood. However, it also does far more, for ostension is the primary process by 
                                                          
1 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: §199 
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which all behaviours are learned and refined (note that when considering gestures and language 
together, words too can serve the role of the ostensive ‘point’). 
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TO CONVEY CONTENT 
 
‘Does your watch tell you what year it is?’ 
‘Of course not,’ Alice replied very readily: ‘but that’s because it stays the same year for such a long 
time together.’ 
‘Which is just the case with mine,’ said the Hatter. 
Alice felt dreadfully puzzled. The Hatter’s remark seemed to have no meaning in it, and yet it was 
certainly English.  
 - Lewis Carroll1 
 
While the focus of much thinking in this paper so far has been on ostension, it is here that we 
shall depart from such considerations. Ostension served to bring the issue at hand (the 
distinction between gestures and language) into sharp relief, but it is just one of several paths 
that lead to this same place. Now that we have arrived, we can set up camp, gather resources, 
and begin to scout back down some of the other paths. That is the purpose of this chapter - to 
develop a sketch of what a new theory of content-conveying behaviours will look like, to 
examine how these thoughts align with our common and philosophical thoughts about language 
and gestures, and to begin to probe into the other philosophical areas that have something at 
stake in this topic. 
The crux of my argument (as it were) is that which is contained in the previous chapter - the 
idea that we cannot meaningfully draw a distinction between gestures and language. What 
follows will be my own thoughts about the consequences of such a move, however I do not 
take the thoughts in this chapter to be the only way to extend the thoughts of the previous 
chapter. I imagine that some of what I say here will only gain traction with those of a particular 
persuasion, and that others with different inclinations regarding various philosophical topics 
will differ in relevant ways. However, these thoughts will at the very least provide insight into 
what is at stake, show what a potential reformulation of our theories might amount to, and 
stimulate a more detailed and considered account of how to proceed with content-conveying 
behaviours under our consideration. 
 
                                                          
1 Carroll, L., Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, (Cambridge: Worth Press, 2015):  74 
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A THEORY OF CONTENT CONVEYANCE 
Now, the first task at hand is to examine what we can say about content-conveying behaviours. 
We already have at hand an excellent account of the way in which gestures convey content, 
and what that content is - that in Engelland’s account of ostension. To recap: our gestures 
manifest our intention, and reveal a certain engagement with the world. When another is 
witness to this engagement, they can ‘mirror’ it, and reproduce it from their own perspective. 
This institutes ‘joint presence’, where both people are attending to the same object and in the 
same way, thereby aligning their manifest minds. 
To reformulate this in terms of our new object of attention, content-conveying behaviours:  
Content-conveying behaviours convey content from one person to another. The 
content that they convey is the actor’s engagement with objects of their 
attention. They convey this content by making the engagement manifest. By 
following the behaviours of others, we can track their engagement with objects, 
and engage with them similarly, provided the objects in question are also under 
our consideration (by this I mean that they are candidates for our own attention). 
This establishes ‘joint presence’ and aligns the manifest minds of the actor and 
audience. The complexity of the content-conveying behaviour is loosely 
proportional to the complexity of the content which can be conveyed - a more 
complex behaviour allows for the conveyance of more complex kinds of 
engagement with more complex objects. 
These claims are relatively agnostic regarding other topics in the philosophy of language, as 
well as gesture and action theory (I have in mind topics like the nature of meaning, reference, 
translation, thought, etc.). I say ‘relatively’ because I accept that the specific way in which I 
have formulated it relies on certain theoretical notions (particularly talk of concepts like 
‘manifestation’ and ‘joint presence’), but the ‘shell’, as it were, does not exclude any particular 
philosophical persuasions, and could easily be reformulated in differing ways. Even if one were 
to radically redefine the ‘content’ and the way it is conveyed, they would still find themselves 
benefitting from the shift of emphasis on language and gestures to content-conveying 
behaviours, and many of the points to come in this chapter will still be applicable. 
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OUR SHARED CONSIDERATION 
Recall from the start of this paper that my use of ‘object’ does not refer to physical ‘objects’, 
but rather anything which can be the ‘object’ of attention. However, we can at this point we 
need to place some restrictions on ‘objects’ – at least on which objects are going to be viable 
for successful communication. In order for the audience to understand the actor’s engagement 
with objects, they need to be objects of ‘shared consideration’. This means that they must be 
objects to which both can attend, and in (roughly) the same way. It must be something of which 
both have some understanding, and their understanding should be roughly similar. Something 
which is directly present to two people will often cause them to understand it in similar ways, 
but this is not necessarily so. For example, if one person has background understanding that 
allows them to understand something new more readily, then even with the same experience 
of an object, they will understand it better than someone who does not have this understanding. 
Think of the way an ‘Introduction to Philosophy’ course would equip someone who takes it to 
understand philosophical concepts easier than someone who does not. Similarly, people can 
experience objects that are directly physically present in different ways (if, for example, they 
are seeing different sides), and so come to understand the object differently. When these kinds 
of gaps in understanding occur, the object becomes less directly under shared consideration, 
and so the interlocutors become less able to track each other’s engagements, making 
communication imprecise. 
Consider the passage from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland1 with which I opened this 
chapter. Here we have an interesting breakdown in communication, and one which brings us 
away from talk of just physical objects. There are multiple ways in which this passage could 
be understood: Perhaps the Hatter did mean to convey something - regarding his watch or 
maybe ‘his year’. If it were his watch, then perhaps it could be under Alice and the Hatter’s 
shared consideration (if Alice has a good enough view of it, has seen it functioning long 
enough, etc.). If this is the case, then the communication has failed not because they are unable 
to institute joint presence, but they have merely failed to do so (because the Hatter’s words 
have not revealed his engagement sufficiently). If the watch is not under their shared 
consideration, or the Hatter was in fact talking about ‘his year’ (which Alice is very unlikely 
to have experience of), then communication has failed because of this very fact - the Hatter is 
engaging with something that Alice cannot track. But consider also, perhaps the Hatter 
genuinely does not have anything ‘in mind’ when he speaks, and is merely combining words 
                                                          
1 Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland: 74 
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in order to intentionally confuse Alice. In this case, we have an asymmetric joint presence from 
the Hatter’s point of view. The object of the Hatter’s intention is no longer the watch or year, 
but it is also not ‘nothing’. It is Alice’s confusion. For Alice, the communication seems to have 
broken down, but from the Hatter’s perspective the act has been successful. As such, this 
example is useful because it shows us not just the basic ways in which communication might 
break down, but it also reveals the ways in which we might communicate partially or non-
ideally. 
 
LOOSE COMMUNICATION 
What this brings to our attention is the fact that our communication can be rough. Insofar as an 
object is not wholly under our shared consideration, our communication does not necessarily 
completely break down, it just becomes loose. Again, we see the importance of ‘understanding’ 
the behaviours of others, rather than ‘knowing’ them. If successful communication consists in 
my ‘knowing’ what you were communicating, then any hint of vagueness or looseness would 
immediately be marked as a failure. However, the mark of successful communication should 
be the transfer of understanding. Even in our common use of language, it seems most apt to 
say, “I understand what you are saying” - and insofar as one might say “I know what you are 
saying” they are employing ‘know’ in a very weak sense (for example, they surely cannot be 
rationally criticised for an incorrect such claim in the same way as they would be for claiming 
“I know that 2+2=5”). 
There are many ways in which our understandings of objects are going to differ. For physically 
present objects, something as minor as our different perspectives will render us unable to 
consider the one object in the same way, and for conceptual, or non-present objects, the history 
of our experience with it will determine how we understand it. Alongside each of these, a 
person’s cognitive ability, understanding of other related objects and other various other 
individual circumstances are going to impact their understanding of objects. As such, no two 
people’s understandings of any one object are likely to be exactly the same. Is this a problem? 
Well, both no and yes. 
The fact that our understandings of objects are generally going to differ leads us to the idea that 
all of our communication is going to be loose. However, I have answered ‘no’ to the above 
because this itself does not seem to be too great a problem. Sperber and Wilson, for example, 
argue that literal talk, loose talk and metaphorical talk, “differ not in kind, but only in degree 
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of looseness”1. They do not think that this undermines the possibility of communication, but 
that it in fact makes far better sense of our actual experiences than ‘precise’ communication 
does. 
It certainly seems, at the very least, that this view of communication can make better sense of 
our common experiences of interacting with others. In our everyday lives, we accept that just 
about anything we say might be misinterpreted (we do not expect it to be, but if it is we are not 
caused any great cognitive crisis) which itself points toward the fact that we do not seem to 
think we communicate precisely and perfectly. When confronted by the question “What do you 
mean?”, our response is to shift the burden to something that is more likely to be under our 
shared consideration. Perhaps by reference to a dictionary definition we settle the terms of the 
discussion (or rather, we refer our misunderstanding to a different set of words (those in the 
definition) and hope that we find closer agreement on their meanings - while also spreading 
the load of the confusion between a larger group of terms, mitigating the damage of any 
confusion over an individual term). Or perhaps we will resort to ‘simpler’ content-conveying 
behaviours, like gestures, which can be directly physically shared (enabling our experience of 
them to more readily align). 
These ideas bring us to the reason why we also answered “yes” to the question above. For if 
we accept that all our talk is at least partially loose, we need to account for the fact that it 
usually seems relatively tight. This is to say that we generally do manage to successfully 
communicate, and find ourselves rarely just ‘talking past each other’, so to speak. The ideas of 
Engelland come to the end of their usefulness here. It is at this juncture that his invocation of 
an Aristotelean notion of ‘human nature’ standardly arises, but this will no longer serve to settle 
our problems. Let me appropriate the famous example from Quine’s Word and Object (the very 
same that Engelland responds to). When Quine’s linguist goes to a native tribe and hears the 
utterance “gavagai” in the presence of what he would call a ‘rabbit’, his confusion consists (to 
construe it under the theoretical terms used here) in his inability to understand the way in which 
the other person is engaging with the world. The object at hand is not under their shared 
consideration (the two have vastly different experiences of it), and so the linguist is entirely 
unable to know what kind of engagement the utterance “gavagai” is expressing. In fact, the 
linguist cannot even know what kind of object “gavagai” picks our (recall his suggestion that 
perhaps “gavagai” could mean something like “rabbithood is manifested”2 - here the 
                                                          
1 Sperber, D., & Wilson, D., Loose Talk, Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, 86, (1986): 153 
2 Quine, Word and Object: 47 
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engagement is no longer with the physical object, but with the concept, ‘rabbithood’). It should 
be clear that ‘human nature’ will not entirely solve the problem. Perhaps to this tribe, rabbits 
are the primary source of nutrition, and so the utterance “gavagai” engenders an engagement 
with the rabbit that is entirely different to a child saying “rabbit” while talking about a pet. Is 
one of these engagements with the animal at hand not according to human nature? Surely not, 
for it is simultaneously part of our ‘nature’ to hunt food and to care about small, cute animals. 
The bare notion of human nature can get us some of the way towards settling our disparate 
engagements with the world, but we will need a much richer account to take us the rest of the 
distance. 
 
FROM ‘NATURE’ TO FORMS OF LIFE 
To see what this richer account will consist in, allow me to indulge in producing here a well-
known quote from Stanley Cavell: 
We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect 
others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this 
projection will take place (in particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping 
of books of rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the same 
projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and 
feeling, modes of response, senses of humor and of significance and of fulfillment, of 
what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of 
when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—all the whirl 
of organism Wittgenstein calls “forms of life.” Human speech and activity, sanity and 
community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than this. It is a vision as simple 
as it is difficult, and as difficult as it is (and because it is) terrifying.1  
It is our shared “forms of life” that enable us to generally consider objects in similar ways. 
While Cavell is talking particularly about the way in which we understand and project words, 
the same holds for our understanding of and engagement with all kinds of objects (note: words 
are one such kind). The difference between the child’s engagement with a pet rabbit and the 
tribesman’s engagement with the prey comes down to their different forms of life - the form of 
life of the tribe dictates that rabbits are food, where the child’s form of life renders the rabbit a 
companion. And so it is that we come to say things like, “They’re from another world” when 
we encounter someone who we cannot understand (and we can ‘not understand’ all kinds of 
content-conveying behaviours). Their form of life is vastly different to ours, and as a result we 
                                                          
1 Cavell, S., ‘The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy’, in Must We Mean What We Say, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002): 48 
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cannot engage with objects in the same way. Quine himself comes close to making this point 
when he states, “the linguist will turn bilingual and come to think as the natives do”,1 although 
I suspect that he has these around the wrong way. It is the linguist’s coming to experience the 
world in their form of life which changes the way that he thinks, and thus allows him to 
understand they ways that they communicate. 
To return to Quine’s example, there is another way in which our forms of life impact our 
communication with each other. When considering the potential meanings of “gavagai”, Quine 
presents a few possibilities: “‘rabbit’, ‘rabbit stage’, ‘undetached rabbit part’, etc.”2 What might 
it mean to say that “gavagai” means one and not the others? To put that another way: under 
what circumstances would an utterer seek to communicate to an audience about one of those 
things and not the others? And this is to ask: what would a form of life look like that required 
a language to have separate terms for these things (as Wittgenstein notes, “To imagine a 
language is to imagine a form of life”3)? It seems senseless to assert that it means just one and 
not the others, if there is nothing about its deployment which would differ in each case. And 
so, when exposed to language in a broad sense, if nothing about this experience tells us whether 
“gavagai” means ‘rabbit’, ‘rabbit stage’ or ‘undetached rabbit part’ then it is meaningless to 
say that we don’t know which one it means. In this way, when we come to understand language 
both gradually (in that the understanding is constantly being expanded and refined) and all-at-
once (in that we do not acquire one word, then another, then another…) - as is the case with 
my view of language acquisition stated earlier - the radical indeterminacy which Quine 
highlights no longer hold us; of the indefinitely many ways to interpret a new word, in one 
sense the word means all of them, and in another, none. 
One point that I am making is that our form of life not only dictates how we personally engage 
with objects, but it also dictates the things that we desire to communicate about interpersonally. 
Our form of life directly informs the ways in which we seek to communicate in the first place. 
Where there is need to share a particular engagement with something, a behaviour will be 
instituted in order to do so. The form of life of a group involves not only what the individuals 
are interested in, but also what the collective is. And so it is that sharing a form of life not only 
                                                          
1 Quine, ‘Speaking of Objects’: 5 
2 Quine, Word and Object: 48 
3 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: §19 
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allows for two individuals to engage similarly with the world from 1st-personal perspectives, 
but to engage with each other from a 2nd-personal perspective.1 
Through our shared forms of life, communication with each other generally succeeds, despite 
being inevitably loose. On these grounds, we also have the resources to understand various 
quirks or features of language and communication. It is, for example, in this way that two 
people speaking the same language can be, as it were, unintelligible to each other. Where a 
language is shared, but forms of life have drastically diverged, people find themselves unable 
to track each other’s behaviours (that is to say, their engagement with the world). And similarly, 
we can explain the evolution of languages, and the development of dialects. Wittgenstein notes 
that “Nothing is commoner than for the meaning of an expression to oscillate… And mostly in 
such a case the shift of meaning is not noted”2. These shifts occur because the form of life of a 
people changes, and so their language updates in order to communicate the things that are of 
increasing or decreasing importance in people’s (and the people’s) lives. And so language 
evolves in order to maintain expressivity and usefulness, in spite of the shifting landscape of 
people’s interests. Wittgenstein puts it this way, “… new types of language, new language-
games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete or forgotten”3. While 
the form of life of a people is intrinsically connected to the ways in which they engage the 
world, so too is their language. By considering the broad category of content-conveying 
behaviours, and the connection between engagement with the world and communication, we 
can get far clearer on the nature not only of language and gestures, but also of our forms of life.  
 
MORE THAN JUST SPEECH 
Another area in which the category of content-conveying behaviours allows us to gain insight 
is that of speech acts. In general, the term ‘speech act’ is used to refer to instances of speaking 
in which the act of speaking is relevant as well as (or perhaps sometimes instead of) the 
semantic content of the utterance. Much of the language and thinking in this area has been 
confused by the traditional distinction between language and gestures (or language and action 
more broadly). Note, the term ‘speech acts’ itself implies that it is of note that these are 
language instances which are also actions. But we have shown that all language instances are 
                                                          
1 For more on the inter-relation between forms of life and language see Goodman, N., Ways of Worldmaking, 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978). 
2 Wittgenstein, Zettel: §438 
3 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: §23 
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relevantly actions. This is not to say that the idea of speech acts should be abandoned, but that 
we should consider also the intrinsic interconnection between language uses and our other 
behaviours. Let us consider two core examples of things generally taken to be speech acts: 
apologising and marrying. The first I take to be a speech act of the form “I apologise for…” or 
“I am sorry for…”, and the second I take straight from Austin in the form, “I take … to be my 
lawfully wedded …”1 
In the first case, apology, it is often held that the act of saying “I apologise” institutes the 
apology. By performing the relevant speech act, one has created a change in their interpersonal 
relationships, and altered the normative landscape. I think, however, that this formulation 
places far too much importance on the individual language use. When someone generally 
behaves in an apologetic manner (by making amends, endeavouring to avoid causing similar 
harm, etc.), we are inclined to say “They are clearly apologetic”. But yet, if they refuse to say 
“I am sorry”, we immediately change our minds, and say that they are evidently not apologetic. 
This seems to be grounds to say that just behaving apologetically is not enough to institute an 
apology, and that the act of saying “I apologise” is essential. 
This example is conceptually impossible, however. One cannot display all the relevant 
apologetic behaviour, and yet refuse to say “I apologise”, because saying this is part of the 
relevant apologetic behaviour. On the other hand, if someone appears apologetic but is unable 
to apologise explicitly (perhaps the person they have wronged is deceased), we do not consider 
this to be a reason to say that they are not sorry. And from a final perspective, if someone says 
“I am sorry”, but continues to behave poorly otherwise, we say that they were never really 
apologetic in the first place – the speech act just wasn’t enough. There is a range of important 
behaviours that are associated with apologising, a speaking the relevant words is just one of 
them.  
One might be tempted to say that the other behaviours that are associated are merely relevant 
as felicity conditions for the speech act, which remains primary. For example, in the last case, 
the speech act isn’t enough because it didn’t meet certain felicity conditions (that the speaker 
feels genuinely remorseful, that the speaker has a desire to avoid similar poor behaviours, etc.), 
and the continued bad behaviour is a result of this shortcoming. I think this is a misconstrual 
of the situation, because it still fails to explain how we can ‘apologise’ without the speech act. 
Certainly, an apology that does not contain the explicit words “I am sorry” is a strange case, 
                                                          
1 Austin, J. L., How to do Things With Words, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975): 5 
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but consider the following: Alice murders Bob in the heat of passion. Later, Alice turns herself 
in to the police, pleads guilty, and while in prison endeavours to make amends and give back 
to the community. Immediately, we surely want to say that Alice’s behaviour has changed the 
circumstances in same kind of way that a standard, explicit apology would entail. Even without 
the speech act, Alice has instituted an apology in every relevant sense. Clearly, holding the 
speech instance in a privileged place was mistaken, and so we have no reason to consider this 
to just be a case of building felicity conditions into our speech act.  
Clearly, there are a range of potential content-conveying behaviours which convey an 
apologetic-engagement to those wronged. And the relevant behaviours for a particular instance 
of apology will be dictated by context, and our form of life. With understanding of both the 
context and the relevant form of life, it will come for free, so to speak, the behaviours which 
will be necessary to institute an apology under given circumstances. Saying “I apologise” 
seems to be the most important part of an apology perhaps because it is most commonly a 
relevant behaviour – the kinds of situations which would preclude it from being relevant (for 
example, losing the ability to communicate) are rare. 
The same general point will be made for the case of marrying; there are a variety of behaviours 
that are relevant, beyond the speech act. One must do more than just say “I take …  to be my 
lawfully wedded …” - for example they must sign a marriage certificate and consummate the 
marriage (note the way in which a marriage can be considered invalid if this is not done). 
Marriage, as a legally (or religiously, or culturally) defined concept, has sharper delineations 
regarding the relevant behaviours, for there are explicit rules regarding what ‘counts’ as a 
marriage, but there remains a plurality of behaviours which are important in instituting a 
marriage. This same point could be made regarding any of the classic examples of speech acts: 
naming, bequeathing, betting, etc.1 In each case, while the relevant speech act is an important 
part of the group of behaviours, it is not necessarily the only such important behaviour. Our 
consideration of the role that speech acts have within our language should, I think, be shifted 
to a consideration of the content-conveying behaviours which institute relevant interpersonal 
and normative changes. 
 
                                                          
1 ibid. page 5-6 
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CONCLUSION 
While I have only briefly touched on the various issues and ideas at play, I have at least shown 
that many different thoughts in the philosophy of language (language acquisition, the nature of 
meaning, looseness of communication, ambiguity and speech acts) have something important 
at stake in the category of content-conveying behaviours. I think there are many more fingers 
in the one pie (for example I think there is much to say about reference, theories of mind, 
language of thought, and others), but have not touched on them here. Without a distinct 
boundary between gestures and language, many of these topics can be seen under a new light. 
The question of language acquisition is completely reformulated – instead of explaining how 
we cross the sharp gap between gestures and language to acquire our ‘first words’, we are 
interested in the way in which we gradually come to deepen and expand our understandings of 
various behaviours. Similarly, questions about meaning become far more sharply focused on 
interpersonal communication, for ‘meaning’ exists in the 2nd-personal space of reciprocal 
engagement. Speech acts (to maintain the traditional name) become about far more than just 
speech, and our consideration shifts the entire range of content-conveying behaviours that 
institute significant normative changes. 
The answers that I have tried to supply (at least briefly) to these new questions stem from my 
own formulation of the category of content-conveying behaviours. Those who have different 
theoretical dispositions will doubtless answer these questions in different ways, but the most 
important thing is that the old, ill-conceived questions (which rely on the gesture-language 
divide) are disposed of.  
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